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The European Commission has often used its merger-review power to challenge 
high-profile acquisitions involving non-EU companies, giving rise to concerns that its 
competition authority has evolved into a powerful tool for industrial policy. The 
Commission has been accused of deliberately targeting foreign—especially American—
acquirers, while facilitating the creation of European national champions. These 
concerns, however, rest on a few famous anecdotes.  In this Article, we introduce a 
unique dataset that allows us to provide the first rigorous examination of these claims. 
Our analysis of the over 5,000 mergers reported to the Commission between 1990 and 
2014 reveals no evidence that the Commission has systematically used its authority to 
protectionist ends. If anything, our results suggest that the Commission is less likely to 
challenge transactions involving non-EU acquirers. Our analysis therefore challenges 
the common notion of European antitrust protectionism and shifts the burden of proof to 








1. Introduction1  
The European Commission’s merger-review power has been a subject of controversy 
among lawmakers and commentators for more than two decades.2 One reason why is that 
the Commission has sometimes used its extensive competition authority to prohibit high-
profile mergers involving non-EU firms—even where those same acquisitions are 
approved by other competition authorities. The Commission’s 2001 decision to block the 
$42 billion acquisition of Honeywell by General Electric—a merger approved by the U.S. 
Department of Justice—is perhaps the most well-known of these cases, an anecdote that 
looms large in competition-law lore. But GE/Honeywell does not stand alone. In the 
name of competition law, the Commission has repeatedly blocked or forced significant 
restructuring of mergers involving a wide range of well-known American firms, 
including Boeing, MCI WorldCom, Time Warner and UPS. 
 
																																																								
1  We are grateful to the European Commission for sharing data on its merger decisions and to Jo 
Seldeslachts for sharing data on measures of industry concentration. We benefited from helpful discussions 
with Jeffrey Gordon, Amit Khandelwal, Joshua Mitts, Janet Lu, and Christoph Engels, and participants at 
the American Law and Economics Conference, Comparative and International Administrative Law and 
Politics Workshop at UC Berkeley, the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe, the Conference 
on Empirical Legal Studies, and the Columbia Law School Faculty Workshop. We are grateful to Julian 
Beach, An Duong, Kevin Hennecken, Abraham Lowenstein, Sarah Mac Dougall, Gregory Swartz, Kate 
Thompson, Sara Thomson, Eliana Torrado Franco, and Claudie Tirefort for exceptional research assistance, 
and to the Columbia Law School Program on Corporate Law and Policy and Philippe P. Dauman Faculty 
Research Fund for financial support.  This material is based upon work supported by the National Science 
Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program under Grant No. DGE-16-44869. Any opinions, 
findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
2	We refer to the term “merger” throughout this article, even though many transactions that the Commission 
reviews under its merger control regulation consist of stock or asset acquisitions as opposed to statutory 
mergers. However, our terminology is consistent with the well-established practice in competition law 
literature, which systematically uses the term “merger control” to capture both mergers and acquisitions. 	
3	
	
These high-profile interventions have raised concerns that the Commission is using its 
merger-review power to advance protectionist industrial policy rather than competition. 
In the wake of GE/Honeywell itself, for example, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill 
called the Commission’s decision “off the wall,” describing the Commission as 
“autocratic,” and the Department of Justice’s chief antitrust enforcement official noted 
the Commission’s “divergence” from the principle that “the antitrust laws protect 
competition, not competitors.” (Wilke, 2001.) Members of the U.S. Congress expressly 
accused the Commission of “using its merger-review process as a tool to protect and 
promote European industry at the expense of U.S. competitors.” (Wilke, 2001.). Today, 
the primary concern is the European Commission’s mounting antitrust investigations of 
US high-tech companies, including Google, Qualcomm, and Apple, which critics say 
reflect the EU’s attempt to offset US technological edge and tilt the market in favor of 
their weaker European rivals (Scott, 2015.).  
 
The notion that the Commission’s merger-review authority is used to protect European 
firms from foreign competition should not be taken lightly. For one thing, the economic 
stakes are high: in Europe alone, the value of mergers and acquisitions in 2014 was about 
$900 billion. For another, the increasingly international focus of merger activity makes 
clear that only rarely—if ever—will a significant merger escape the Commission’s 
antitrust mandate. Yet the idea that a critical gatekeeper for global merger activity is 
using its authority to protect favored firms rests largely on a few famous anecdotes. The 
Commission’s decision-making has not been subjected to the kind of systematic 




In this Article, we introduce a unique dataset that permits us to provide the first careful 
examination of the determinants of the Commission’s merger review policy. The data 
include information on all of the mergers reported to the Commission between 1990 and 
2014—more than 5,000 proposed transactions—as well as detail on the industry, 
transaction value, and nationality associated with each transaction. Our data also include 
detailed variables describing whether, and to what extent, the Commission chose to 
intervene in each case. While previous analysis of the Commission’s decisions (e.g. 
Lindsay et al. (2003), Aktas et al. (2012)) has relied on small, hand-drawn samples 
ranging from 96 to 245 cases, our novel data offer the unique opportunity to examine the 
Commission’s enforcement record across more than 25 years and over 5,000 cases.3  
 
We identify evidence that, contrary to policymakers’ and practitioners’ intuitions, the 
Commission has not intervened more frequently, or more extensively, in transactions 
involving a non-EU- or American-based firm’s acquisition of a European target. Across 
several specifications, coefficients examining the responsiveness of the Commission’s 
challenge rates to transactions involving non-EU acquirers remain negative. Of course, it 
may well be that protectionism plays an occasional role in European merger-review 
cases. We show, however, that the evidence does not support the claim that any such bias 
systematically affects merger-enforcement outcomes in the European Commission. 
																																																								
3 Importantly, study of merger-review decisions in the European Union has an important advantage over 
similar study of U.S. authority in this area. In the United States, the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission publish only decisions relating to mergers they oppose, creating sample bias. By 
contrast, the European Commission is required to publish all of its decisions, including a decision not to 





The Article proceeds as follows. We first describe the legal and institutional background 
of Commission merger review. We then consider theoretical reasons why competition-
enforcement authorities may use their merger-review power to pursue protectionist 
industrial policy. Next we describe our data and results. The final section briefly 
concludes. 
 
2. Legal and Institutional Background  
The European Union’s merger regulation was adopted in December 1989 and entered 
into force in September 1990. Pursuant to that regulation, the EU’s main executive body, 
the European Commission, reviews every merger that exceeds the revenue threshold 
established by the EU Treaty. Specifically, parties to a proposed merger must notify the 
Commission about their transaction whenever (1) the parties’ combined annual 
worldwide revenue exceeds € 5 billion and each of at least two of the parties’ annual EU-
wide revenue exceeds € 250 million, or (2) the parties’ combined annual worldwide 
revenue exceeds € 2.5 billion and each of at least two of the parties’ annual EU-wide 
revenue exceeds € 100 million.4 If these thresholds are not met, national competition 
authorities in individual EU member states may still have the power to review the merger 
as a matter of domestic law.  In general, however, whenever a merger “affects trade 
between member states” in Europe, the Commission has the power to review that merger 
and, if it so chooses, intervene.  
																																																								
4 A few additional conditions not relevant to our analysis must also be met in order for a particular merger 
to be reportable to the Commission. 
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The current Merger Regulation, adopted in 2004, directs the Commission to oppose the 
transaction in cases where “[the] concentration would significantly impede effective 
competition, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it.” Such mergers are considered “incompatible 
with the common market” and hence prohibited.5 
The Commission’s merger-review process is divided into two phases.  During Phase I, 
the Commission may either (1) clear the merger without subjecting it into any conditions,  
(2) approve it subject to conditions (such as requiring divestment of certain assets) or (3) 
decide that more information is needed and open an in-depth investigation (that is, initiate 
Phase II). During Phase II, the Commission may again (1) unconditionally clear the 
transaction, (2) conditionally clear it, or, (3) prohibit the transaction. The parties, of 
course, can also withdraw from the merger-review process, and may do so in order to 
preempt a negative decision or for independent economic reasons.  The parties cannot, 
however, close their transaction before they obtain the Commission’s clearance.  
 
The Commission’s merger-review authority is vast. Unlike the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the Commission need not go to court to enjoin a merger. Instead, the Commission 
can reach this decision without involving the European judiciary.6 And, although the 
parties have the right to appeal the decision to the EU’s General Court and, ultimately, 
																																																								
5 The original EU Merger Regulation, adopted in 1990, prohibited mergers that “create or strengthen a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded”.  We 
separately test all results for the periods before and after 2004 but find no significant differences 
attributable to the altered wording of the Merger Regulation. 
6 Many critics have suggested that this procedure essentially renders the Commission the prosecutor, judge, 
and jury of merger review throughout Europe. See  e.g., Competition Policy: Prosecutor, judge and jury: 
Enforcement of competition law in Europe is unjust and must change (The Economist, February 18, 2010); 
Tom Fairless, EU Displaces U.S. as Top Antitrust Cop(WSJ, September 3, 2015). 
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the European Court of Justice, strikingly few Commission decisions in this area are ever 
challenged in the courts. Thus, in virtually all cases—over 99% of mergers reviewed—
the Commission has the final say, making the Commission perhaps the single most 
important player in worldwide antitrust. Yet, as we explain below, relatively little is 
known about the determinants of the Commission’s decisions when reviewing those 
cases—and, in particular, whether protectionist policy intuitions systematically motivate 
them. 
 
3. Theoretical Motivation 
Governments’ historical tendency to engage in trade protectionism is a well-accepted 
feature of international political economy. Protectionists’ tool of choice has historically 
involved tariffs, but a generation of trade liberalization has dramatically diminished the 
use of tariffs to shield domestic industry from foreign competition. Thus, some argue, 
governments today pursue protectionism through alternative means that are harder to 
detect than explicit tariff policies (e.g., Kono, 2006). 
 
One such alternative means, some critics have argued, is antitrust policy (Guzman 1998; 
Horn and Levinsohn 2001; Iacobucci 1997-1998; Richardson 1999; Williams and 
Rodriguez 1995). 7  These theorists contend that antitrust policy can offset both the 
																																																								
7  We acknowledge, of course, that the eradication of one source of protectionism may well lead 
governments to seek another way to protect labor markets from the effects of free trade (Bhagwati 2000). 
Thus, diligence regarding potential future use of antitrust for  protectionist purposes may well be warranted. 
Meaningful study of any such use, however, should ultimately be motivated by empirical evidence. As we 
explain below, the evidence on European Commission antitrust decision-making offers no support for the 
proposition that the merger-review process has been used for protectionist purposes. 
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economic gains and distributive effects of trade liberalization.8  Protectionist antitrust 
policy can manifest itself, for example, in the form of a biased enforcement strategy that 
applies different standards to domestic and foreign firms, with antitrust agencies applying 
more stringent standards to acquisitions by foreign-owned firms than companies that are 
locally owned.  
 
There are several plausible reasons to believe that the merger-review process would be an 
attractive means of achieving protectionist policy goals. For one thing, opposing 
acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign firms is often politically popular. Mergers 
are frequently associated with employment losses, leading labor advocates to oppose 
mergers with an adverse effect on domestic labor markets. The public may also fear that 
foreign acquirers will move significant economic activity back to their home jurisdiction. 
Antitrust agencies might similarly be responsive to public demand to protect domestic 
brands. Just as many Americans may be unwilling to contemplate Coca-Cola as a 
foreign-owned company, Europeans might have strong opposition to allowing Siemens or 
Mercedes-Benz be associated with anything but European industrial might. Finally, 
foreign acquisitions may also increase the political influence of foreign nations in the 
target’s market, a particularly salient concern when the foreign nation’s culture and 
political system differ significantly from the target’s.  
 
Nevertheless, there are also compelling reasons to be skeptical that merger-review 
authority is an effective tool for achieving protectionist economic policy. First, 
																																																								
8 For a more extensive theoretical debate on whether countries set their antitrust policies in response to their 
trade flows, see Guzman (2004) and Bradford (2007).  
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systematic bias against foreign acquirers could undermine the interests of domestic firms 
if other merger-review authorities chose to retaliate. Such bias would also generate 
significant collateral damage, undermining the interests of many European firms as well 
as those of individual (European) shareholders and employees who stand to benefit from 
the merger. 9  
 
Moreover, three institutional characteristics unique to the Commission make 
protectionism an especially unlikely motivation for its merger-review decisions. First, the 
Commission is subject to an unusual degree of transparency, and is required to justify all 
of its merger-review decisions—whether or not it chooses to intervene—in detailed 
public decisions, making it difficult to disguise systematic protectionist bias. Second, 
although judicial review of Commission decisions is rare, it can be meaningful: in 2002, 
after a series of public defeats in court, the Commission significantly reformed its 
approach to merger review. Thus, systematic bias against foreign acquirers would raise a 
nontrivial risk of reversal in the courts.10  
 
																																																								
9	Agencies outside the EU could also undermine the Commission’s attempt to shield its local firms from 
rigorous merger scrutiny due to the “effects doctrine” that underlies most antitrust laws. The effects 
doctrine holds that every country may claim antitrust jurisdiction over any company as long as the 
company's activities have an “effect” on the domestic market of that country. Thus, even if the European 
Commission let an anticompetitive merger involving European companies proceed, the merger could face 
scrutiny in another jurisdiction in which merging parties have sales or assets. The Commission’s ability to 
shield European firms from merger control is hence diluted by the prospect of concurrent and compensating 
jurisdiction exercised by other impacted states.  
10 It is possible, of course, that even systematically biased Commission decisions in service of protectionist 
goals could survive judicial review if European judges, too, were prepared to use its power to pursue those 
goals. We think it unlikely, however, that the judiciary would be coopted in this way, and are aware of no 
theoretical or empirical work suggesting that this is the case. 
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Finally, the Commission’s governance structure makes it unlikely that policymakers 
could succeed in pursuing protectionism through the merger-review process. The 
Commission’s case teams that prepare proposed decisions typically consist of lawyers 
and economists from across the European Union, only few of which will come from the 
target nation.  Any final decision rests on the vote of the entire Commission, consisting of 
a Commissioner from each member state—only one being from the target nation. Any 
decision to challenge a welfare-enhancing merger to protect a particular nation’s 
economic interests would hence require all twenty-eight Commissioners and a 
multinational case team to forego benefits to consumers across Europe to hand a 
protectionist benefit to a particular nation’s industry. Arguably, the required level of 
European solidarity for such a strategy has never existed.  
 
Nevertheless, whether the Commission’s merger-review authority has systematically 
been used to protect European companies from competition abroad is ultimately an 
empirical question. In the next section, we describe the relatively limited empirical 
evidence that has been brought to bear on this important issue thus far. 
 
4. Prior Empirical Work 
Previous work on the determinants of Commission antitrust enforcement has produced 
decidedly mixed results. Bergman et al. (2005), relying on a sample of 96 mergers 
notified to the Commission between 1990 and 2002, find that political variables—such as 
the nationality of the merging firms—have no significant effect on the probability of an 
adverse ruling. Similarly, Lindsay et al. (2003), examining 245 Commission merger 
11	
	
decisions between 2000 and 2002, do not find the nationality of the bidder to be a 
statistically meaningful predictor of Commission action.  
 
By contrast, Aktas et al. (2004, 2007, 2012) have published a series of papers seeking to 
establish whether Commission merger review reflects a pro-EU bias. In their initial 2004 
study, the authors found that investors anticipate higher costs to merging parties when the 
Commission intervenes in a case involving a non-EU bidder.  In a 2007 follow-up piece, 
the authors examined a sample of 290 Commission merger decisions between 1990 and 
2000, finding that the Commission is more likely to oppose a merger when the bidder is a 
foreign national and when the merger adversely affects European competitors.11 But in 
2012, Aktas et al reevaluated that finding, concluding on the basis of an updated sample 
that the bidder’s status as a foreign national is not a meaningful predictor of outcomes in 
the Commission merger-review process.  
 
By contrast, Ozden (2005) studies the 209 largest mergers between 1995 and 1999 
involving at least one US firm. That study finds that more extensive merger review is 
more likely if, among other things, the target is European or all U.S. firms in the industry 
have high market share. Ozden concludes that the higher likelihood of merger review in 
																																																								
11 Importantly, the nationality of the bidder alone was not statistically significant in Aktas et al (2007). 
Instead, a bias in Commission decision-making materialized only when two conditions were met: first, 
when the bidder was a foreign firm, and second, when local competition is harmed (as measured by 
negative competitor returns at the time the merger is announced). 
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cases involving a European target reveals a political and economic tendency to protect 
European firms.12 
 
None of this prior work, however, made use of a comprehensive sample of all mergers 
reported to the Commission since the inception of the merger-review process in 1990. 
Nor, for the reasons described below, did those studies feature covariates addressing 
significant variation over time, among industries, and among nations. In this Article, we 
introduce a novel dataset that offers the most comprehensive view of the Commission’s 
antitrust decisions to date. We describe that dataset in detail in the next section.  
 
5. Data and Summary Statistics 
5.1 Description of the Data 
In this Article, we introduce a novel dataset that includes every merger reported to the 
Commission between 1990—the first year of the current EU merger-control regime— 
and August 2014. 
 
The dataset was constructed by hand from six different sources. We begin with data from 
the Commission itself13 on each transaction reported to the EU, including the parties, 
their roles in the transaction (such as seller or acquirer), their nationalities (as reflected by 
																																																								
12 Other empirical work on European merger control has focused on establishing the decisions’ error rate 
(Duso et al 2003) or effectiveness (Duso et al. 2011). These studies are often structured as event studies, 
comparing stock market reactions at the time of the transaction’s announcement date to their stock market 
reaction when the decision is reached.  Other papers have considered the relative influence of various 
factors, such as market share or barriers to entry, on Commission merger decisions (Plagnet 2005; Lindsay 
2003). More recently, Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2012) have considered the effects of Commission 
policy on merger deterrence. None of these studies, however, was able to test their hypotheses using a 
dataset featuring the comprehensive longitude and control variables described below. 
13 We express our deep gratitude to the Commission for sharing these data with us.  
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the location of each firm’s headquarters), and the industry or industries (identified by 
NACE code14) for each proposed transaction.15  We merge this dataset by hand with the 
transactions in the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) transactions database, which 
includes dozens of variables on transactions (including ones that fail to close) and their 
parties.  We also hand-collect transaction values for each transaction from the FactSet 
Financial Services Dataset, Factiva, Zephyr, and other sources, to supplement and 
confirm those in the SDC database.16 
 
We create variables on European relative market size and market concentration using 
sales data from Amadeus, which has European sales data for 21 million companies. As 
our measure of market concentration, we construct the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI), in which market concentrations range from 0 to 1, for European-wide sales at the 
2-digit industry level.  As our measure of relative industry market size, we use industry 
sales divided by the total sales in that year across industries. 
 
Over the period we consider, firms from 97 countries have been involved in transactions 
reviewed by the Commission. We use dummy variables signifying whether a party’s 
nationality is among the member nations of the EU at the time the Commission received 
notice of the transaction—that is, whether the party is an “EU party” or “non-EU party”, 
																																																								
14  NACE, which refers to “nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté 
européenne,” is the statistical classification of economy activity used by the European Union. It builds on 
the United Nations’ industry classification, known as ISIC, and is comparable to the SIC codes used in the 
United States for similar purposes. In our dataset, we record NACE industry at the six-digit level but, for 
simplicity, conduct our analysis at the two-digit or four-digit level. 
15 Occasionally, the dataset provided to us by the Commission was missing observations or information; in 
those cases, we supplemented the data by hand. 
16  Through the combination of these datasets as well as additional research, we were able to locate 
transaction values for more than two thirds of the transactions in our dataset. 
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as well as whether a party is U.S.-based. We assign the corporate nationality using the 
company’s address as reported to the Commission when notifying the merger. As a 
robustness check, we re-create these variables using the primary place (nation) of 
business from the SDC database. 
 
We identify the role of each party to the transaction (for example, acquirer or target) 
using a combination of the EU Commission’s designations and independent research.  
For our variables of interest related to the nationalities of the parties, we define a merger 
as having a non-EU acquirer if at least one acquirer-side party was non-EU and an EU 
seller if at least one seller-side party had EU nationality.17  For robustness, we include 
extensive alternative variable definitions in our regressions in the Appendix. 
 
We construct a series of outcome variables that reflect the Commission’s decision in each 
individual case. In response to a merger notification, the Commission can proceed in a 
number of ways.  For our main specifications, we categorize the decision outcomes in 
binary fashion as constituting or not constituting a “challenge.”  We consider any 
decision that imposes costs or delays to the parties as a challenge. Since a withdrawal of a 
merger is often a sign of the parties anticipating a challenge, we treat withdrawals as 
challenges as well. 
 
In order to better capture the richness of the Commission’s powers, however, and as a 
robustness check, we also create a numerical index, ranging from 1 through 6, assigning 
																																																								
17 Throughout, we use “acquirer” to mean any acquirer-side party, and “seller” to mean any seller-side 
party (generally the target). 
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values to each class of merger decisions, as shown in the table below. These numbers 
correspond approximately to the deterrent effect of the Commission’s activity on the 
progress of the merger—or, in other words, the more granular degree of opposition 
between cleared and prohibited mergers. Each number corresponds to one or more 
decision articles referenced as the legal basis for the Commission’s eventual decision.  
We also create binary variables reflecting different “cut-off” points as robustness checks. 
 
 
Decision Outcome Assigned value 
Ruled beyond the scope of the Commission’s authority. 1 
Phase I clearance without conditions. 2 
Phase I clearance with conditions and obligations and mergers 
withdrawn at Phase I.18 
3 
Phase II clearance without conditions. 4 
Phase II clearance with conditions and obligations and mergers 
withdrawn at Phase II. 
5 
Absolute prohibition. 6 
TABLE 1. NUMERICAL INDEX OF COMMISSION MERGER-REVIEW DECISION TYPES 
In total, parties notified 5,499 transactions to the Commission from 1990 to August 2014.  
Of these, we could identify at least one party on the acquirer-side and at least one party 
on the seller-side for 5,259 transactions.  The remaining transactions were mergers of 
equals or otherwise had a deal structure that made it impossible for us to identity an 
																																																								
18 The Withdrawn (N/1) decision article was placed within Category 3 to account for the balance between 
unconditionally cleared Phase I mergers in Category 2 and Phase II mergers in Category 4. If the parties 
withdrew the merger after or during a Phase I evaluation, the merger presumably faced a degree of 
opposition beyond an automatic clearance. A parties notifies the Commission, the Commission may apply 
conditions or otherwise cause a delay in Phase I, causing the parties abandon the merger. From a temporal 
and degree of opposition point of view, this places mergers withdrawn at Phase I as most comparable to 
mergers where the Commission applied Art. 6(1)(b) with conditions and obligations. It's possible that 
parties withdraw the merger for purely economic reasons unrelated to regulatory intervention, but the 
Decision Articles don't permit us to distinguish the cause of withdrawal. Similarly, as Category 4 refers to 
Phase II mergers, placing mergers Withdrawn in Phase I would be inappropriate. The same reasoning 
applies to why Withdrawn (N/2) mergers have been placed within Category 5.  
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acquiring and selling party. We also exclude joint ventures given their different deal 
structure, leaving us with 3,924 transactions.  The availability of key control variables, 
most notably the transaction value, further reduces the sample size. Our main 
specifications use the subset of 2,351 mergers for which we have transaction value, 
market structure information, and variables from the SDC.  However, our results are 
robust to our choice of sample, including the use of all 5,259 mergers for which the 




5.2 Summary Statistics 
We begin with summary statistics describing the frequency of mergers, including those 
involving non-EU or U.S. parties, over time throughout our data. Figure 1 below 




FIGURE 1. TOTAL MERGERS REPORTED TO EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1990-2013 
Notes: Number of mergers in every two-year period, based on full sample of mergers reported between 
1991 and 2013.  Non-EU (US, respectively) means at least one non-EU (US, respectively) party.  Counts 
are two year averages. Partial year 2014 is omitted. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the number of mergers reported to the Commission has fluctuated 
with the well-known merger waves of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In general, 
the proportion of mergers including non-EU- or U.S.-headquartered parties has remained 
relatively steady over time. On average, 48.3% of the transactions had at least one non-
EU party while 25.9% of the transactions had at least one US party.   
 
We also observe the fraction of mergers that are challenged by the Commission over 
time. Figure 2 below describes the proportion of mergers in our dataset, including 
mergers with non-EU- or U.S.-headquartered parties, that are challenged by the 
Commission: 
 
FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF NOTIFIED MERGERS CHALLENGED BY EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1990-2013 
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Notes: Percentage of mergers challenged in every two-year period, based on full sample of mergers 
reported between 1991 and 2013.  Non-EU (US, respectively) means at least one non-EU (US, 
respectively) party.  Counts are two year averages. Partial year 2014 is omitted. 
 
Overall, 10.1% of the notified mergers in our dataset are challenged in some way by the 
Commission. The challenge rate has generally fallen over time: while 11.3% of mergers 
were challenged in 2001, only 5.9% were challenged in 2011. This graph also reveals 
that, across all years, mergers involving US and non-EU parties are not on average 
challenged at a higher rate than those featuring EU parties (before controlling for any 
aspects of individual transactions). 
 
The binned scatterplot in Figure 3 confirms this significant downward shift in challenge 
rate over time. It also shows no apparent discontinuity as of 2004 following a significant 
revision of the EU Merger Control Regulation that year. 
 
FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF NOTIFIED MERGERS CHALLENGED BY EUROPEAN COMMISSION BY YEAR 
 





Table 2 contains summary statistics on the transactions in the subset of the data 
comprising our sample. It shows that 12.9% of mergers in our sample experience some 
sort of intervention by the Commission or a withdrawal following notification.  It also 
reveals other characteristics of the transactions, including that 34% of the deals are 
financial-sponsor-related, and that 40% of them can be described as horizontal and 
thereby mergers between competitors. 




6.1 Factors in Commission Decision 
Before proceeding to test directly for the role of protectionism, we seek to explain the 
factors that appear to drive the European Commission merger decisions.  The binned 
scatterplot in Figure 4 shows that, as one would expect, the likelihood of Commission 
challenge increases with transaction value (along the x-axis), decreases for large markets 
(large triangles, as opposed to small circles), and increases for highly concentrated (that 
is, high HHI) industries (solid red, as compared to hollow blue).19  Table 3	 shows similar 
results from a logistic regression, which also includes extensive control variables. This is 
by far the most comprehensive evaluation of the factors of EU Commission decision-








Further, using our preferred specification (column 2) and holding all other variables to 
their sample means, we show that a deal that involves a financial sponsor (for example, 
an acquisition by a private equity company) is 7.1 percentage points less likely to be 
challenged; a transaction valued at $1.2 billion is 1.4 percentage points more likely to be 
challenged than one valued at $623 million, the geometric mean; and a deal that the SDC 
database identifies as a hostile acquisition is 9.7 percentage points more likely to be 
challenged. These statistics are consistent with our expectations.  Transactions involving 
a financial sponsor typically do not raise competition concerns in the absence of any 
overlap between the products on the buyer and seller side. Similarly, large deals invoke 
greater scrutiny due to the sheer prominence of such cases and the extent of harm that an 
anti-competitive deal would generate. Hostile takeovers may be more commonly 
challenged because of the difficulties associated in persuading the (reluctant) outgoing 
management to produce needed documentation to the Commission.  
 
FIGURE 4. PERCENTAGE OF NOTIFIED MERGERS CHALLENGED BY EUROPEAN COMMISSION BY 
TRANSACTION VALUE, MARKET SIZE AND HHI 
 
Notes: Each point represents the mean challenge rate within one of seven quantiles of log transaction value. 
Small market (or big market, respectively) is defined as below (or above, respectively) median relative 
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market size, which is in turn defined as the European-wide industry sales divided by total European sales in 
that year.  Low HHI (or large HHI, respectively) is defined as below (or above, respectively) median HHI, 
calculated using European-wide businesses and sales. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here.] 
6.2 Protectionism against Foreign Firms 
Antitrust protectionism is difficult to test rigorously, which may explain the paucity of 
attempts to date to do so. We acknowledge the complexities involved in distinguishing 
cases that were driven by protectionist or other motivations. What we can test, however, 
is whether the nationality of merging firms is a predictor of the Commission’s merger 
challenge after we control for a number of key factors that we expect to be relevant in the 
analysis. 
 
We estimate the Linear Probability Model, 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒( = 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈	𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟( ∗ 𝐸𝑈	𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟( ∗ 𝛾 + 𝑋(:𝛽       (1) 
where Challenge is a binary variable indicating a Commission challenge, NonEU 
Acquiror*EU Seller is a binary variable indicating the presence of both a non-EU 
acquirer and an EU seller, and Xi is a vector-valued set of control variables.20  If the 
Commission were engaged in protectionism of domestic targets against foreign acquirers, 
we would expect the coefficient γ to be positive. 
 
We use the Linear Probability Model to allow for inclusion of industry fixed effects in 
some of our specifications. The Linear Probability Model also facilitates the 
																																																								
20 We estimate a logit model with the same variables and find nearly identical t-statistics.  We use the 
Linear Probability Model in the main text, with some logit specifications in the Appendix for robustness, to 
facilitate interpretation of the magnitude of our estimated coefficients. 
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interpretability of confidence intervals, which convey important information, given our 
non-significant results. However, all of our results are fully robust to use of the logit 
model. For our main specification, we include the logit results in our robustness tables to 
demonstrate this.  
 
Table 4 shows the results of our estimation of Equation (1). 
[Insert Table 4 Here.] 
The coefficient on non-EU-acquirer and EU-seller mergers represents the difference in 
the challenge rate for such mergers as compared to all other mergers, controlling for 
covariates and including fixed effects.  Across all combinations of covariates and fixed 
effects, we find that the coefficient is (insignificantly) negative, whereas we would expect 
to find a positive coefficient if there were protectionism. Column (2) contains our 
preferred specification, which includes all covariates which are significant or nearly 
significant for our outcome variable—Commission challenges—or our variable of 
interest—acquirer and target nationality.  Column (3) contains all variables that are fully 
populated for our sample.21  Columns (4) and (5) include 2-digit and 4-digit industry 
fixed effects (and omit other industry-level variables), with similar results.  We estimate a 
																																																								
21 The additional covariates included in column 3 are: whether the acquirer is in a high tech industry; 
whether the acquirer is a governmental entity; whether the acquisition is of a subsidiary of a larger 
company as opposed to an acquisition of the entire company; whether the target’s ultimate parent is a 
publicly traded company; whether the acquirer fully or partially owns the target after the transaction; 
whether the target was in bankruptcy at the time of the transaction; and whether the acquirer is a special 
purpose vehicle.  We have several other covariates, including acquirer firm size and seller firm size, which 
we omit because they are not significant when controlling for transaction value and because they are not 
well-populated in the data, reducing our sample sizes.  Other covariates, such as whether the stated purpose 




95% confidence interval on the effect of non-EU acquirer-EU seller of -4.0 percentage 
points to 1.6 percentage points.  
 
Table 4 compares mergers with non-EU acquirers and EU sellers to all other mergers in 
the sample. However, an alternative, and perhaps more relevant, comparison group 
consists of mergers involving EU acquirers and EU sellers.  Thus, Table 5 estimates 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒( = 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟( ∗ 𝐸𝑈	𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟( ∗ 𝛾= + 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟(
∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟( ∗ 𝛾> + 𝐸𝑈	𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟( ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟( ∗ 𝛾? + 𝑋(:𝛽 
with separate coefficients for mergers with (i) non-EU acquirer and EU seller, (ii) non-
EU acquirer and non-EU seller, and (iii) EU acquirer and non-EU seller.  Because the 
nationality categories cleanly partition the sample, the estimated coefficients γ represent 
comparisons to the omitted category: the set of transactions involving an EU acquirer and 
EU seller. If the Commission had a tendency to protect domestic acquirers from non-EU 
sellers, we would expect γ1 to be positive; if it had a tendency to intervene in purely non-
EU deals, such as GE-Honeywell, we would expect γ2 to be positive. Table 5 shows that 
neither has a positive coefficient—in fact, in column (4), non-EU acquirer-non-EU seller 
transactions have a marginally significantly negative challenge rate as compared to EU 
acquirer – EU seller transactions. 
 [Insert Table 5 Here.] 
We note that our finding that firm nationalities are not correlated with Commission 






FIGURE 5. PERCENTAGE OF NOTIFIED MERGERS CHALLENGED BY EUROPEAN COMMISSION BY 
TRANSACTION VALUE 
 
Notes: Each point represents the mean challenge rate within one of seven quantiles of log transaction value.  
A transaction has a non-EU acquirer and EU seller if at least one acquirer is from a non-EU nation and at 
least one seller is from an EU nation. 
 
As Figure 5 shows, there is no pattern in bias with respect to transaction size, and, in 
unreported results, the results hold similarly when we subset our regressions only for 
larger deals. This finding is quite stable over time, and does not appear to show any 
industry-specific variation beyond random noise.  Comparing non-EU acquirers versus 
EU acquirers in the subsamples of transactions involving EU targets (or foreign targets, 
respectively) also yields insignificantly negative results. 
 
In Table 6, we run three additional tests.  In column 1, we include interactions with a 
dummy for high-tech industry, to evaluate concerns that the Commission is particularly 
aggressive towards foreign technology acquirers in an effort to protect European 
technological laggards from their more innovative foreign rivals.  In column 2, we use the 
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primary place of business of the acquirer and target (as determined by SDC) rather than 
their nationality as determined by the Commission.  Column 3 mirrors column 2 except 
we use the primary place of business of the acquirer’s ultimate parent.  All show no 
evidence of protectionism. 
 
6.3 Endogeneity Concerns 
We acknowledge that our specification is endogeneous, and therefore cannot be 
interpreted causally.  In particular, to have a causal interpretation, our regression 
specification would have to make the strong assumption that any omitted variables with 
explanatory power are uncorrelated with the variable of interest. Since the ideal 
experiment—random assignment of nationalities to parties who have entered a merger 
agreement—is impossible, we cannot fully address endogeneity concerns.  We note, 
however, that once transaction value and the presence of a financial sponsor in the 
transaction are controlled for, the addition of 14 variables, many of which have 
substantial explanatory power, does not materially shift our estimates.  The R2 of our 
regressions is also quite high for a binary microdata regression, reaching 31% when 4-
digit industry fixed effects are included, leaving less room for additional explanatory 
variables not captured by the existing covariates. 
	
One potential omitted variable relates to the true concentration of each of the product 
markets involved in the merger. We cannot fully control for the true market 
concentration, which would require company-level sales data for each of the specific 
products involved in the merger and accurate data on the geographic boundaries of the 
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(potentially overlapping) product markets.  Omitted variable bias would occur to the 
extent that the portion of true market concentration not captured by our market 
concentration variables is correlated with the party nationalities.   
 
One possible proxy for market concentration could be extracted from Commission 
merger decisions, which sometimes, but not always, delineate the relevant product and 
geographic markets. 22  However, since the definitions of the relevant product and 
geographic market are themselves discretionary Commission decisions, using 
Commission determinations would introduce new and severe endogeneity concerns. We 
are therefore hesitant to examine motivations for Commission behavior by relying on the 
Commission’s own subjective definition of the boundaries of the market and the 
concentration ratios associated with such discretion, for fear of magnifying endogeneity 
concerns.  Instead, we proxy for these features of each transaction by using market 
concentration and market size calculated from extensive European-wide sales data or, as 
an alternative, by relying on industry fixed effects.  The significant loadings on these 
proxies suggest that they are indeed capturing some of the true market concentration. Our 
findings remain robust when we derive the concentration ratios from the target country-
wide sales data for the subset of mergers that involve a EU target. Yet, we concede that 
we cannot fully eliminate the possibility of omitted variable bias in this regard. 
  
																																																								
22	Commission often offers multiple market definitions or leaves the definition of the relevant market open 
when it is not necessary to choose among the various plausible definitions as competition concerns either 
arise or fail to arise under any plausible definition.  When providing market information, the Commission 




Another specific source of bias would arise if the parties did not merge in the first place 
because they anticipated a Commission challenge.  This selection effect would create bias 
if non-EU acquirers and EU sellers were less likely to merge (as compared to other 
nationality combinations).  Again, this issue is inherent in the nonexperimental design 
and cannot be fully resolved.  We note, however, that the data provides some evidence 
this is not driving our results.  Controlling for financial sponsors, non-EU acquirers make, 
on average, significantly larger acquisitions than EU acquirers; the HHI is similar for 
deals with non-EU acquirers than for those with EU acquirers.  There is thus no evidence 
that fear of Commission bias is deterring riskier non-EU acquirer EU seller deals. 
 
We offer two additional observations regarding the reliability of our results.  First, since 
our sample comprises half the entire population (or the entire population, in a robustness 
check), there is little chance that the Commission’s results exhibited nationality 
preference that we failed to capture due to sampling error. 
 
Second, we acknowledge that protectionism could manifest itself in the type of mergers 
that the Commission intervenes in—for example, aggressiveness towards financial-
sponsor deals because those are associated with US acquirers.  If so, adding covariates 
could obfuscate, rather than reveal, protectionism.  Since financial-sponsor deals are 
significantly less likely to be challenged, and since we fail to find a positive coefficient 





6.4 Additional Robustness Checks 
Table 10 in our Appendix performs a series of additional robustness checks on the 
analysis in Table 6.  In our main regressions in Tables 4 and 5, we define a transaction as 
having a non-EU acquirer if at least one acquirer is non-EU. Similarly, we define a 
transaction as having an EU seller if at least one seller is from the EU.  To ensure that our 
results are not driven by this choice of how to partition the sample into groups, in the 
“Reversed Partition” row, we repeat the analysis with the precise opposite partition: 
defining a transaction as having a non-EU acquirer if, and only if, all acquirers are non-
EU, and as having an EU seller if, and only if, all sellers are from the EU.  As an 
additional robustness check on our choice of partitioning, in the “Fraction of Parties” 
row, we assign the nationality to the acquirer and to the seller based on the fraction of 
acquirers that are non-EU, and the fraction of sellers that are from the EU. The results 
remain robust to these alternative specifications.  
 
In our main regressions, we exclude any transactions involving joint ventures.  To ensure 
that this choice does not introduce a bias, in our “Inclusion of Joint Ventures” row, we 
include such parties, treating the joint venture itself as the target and the parents as the 
acquirers. The inclusion of joint ventures does not change the direction or the magnitude 
of the results.  
 
Our main regressions use a Linear Probability Model because they allow for inclusion of 
industry fixed effects.  To ensure that our results are not being driven by the assumptions 
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of the Linear Probability Model, we repeat our tests with a logit model in the “Logit 
Specification” row and find that our results are qualitatively similar. 
 
Further, our main regressions are limited to the subsample of 2,351 transactions for 
which we have data on transaction value and other covariates.  Whether or not we are 
able to retrieve the relevant data for a given transaction on, for example, transaction value 
is likely non-random; thus we recognize that our main sample might be a biased 
subsample of the full population.  To ensure that our results are not being driven by our 
partial subsample, we run a regression in the “Full Set of Transactions” row using 
virtually every transaction (5,259 deals in total) in the dataset—excluding only the small 
number of mergers for which we are unable to determine accurate details of the 
transaction structure.  This specification necessarily excludes covariates other than fixed 
effects for time and the number of parties. In this specification, that the Commission is 
statistically significantly less likely to block mergers with a non-EU acquirer and an EU 
seller. 
 
Our primary specifications use as their outcome variable a simple binary dummy for 
whether the Commission challenges the merger or not. Recognizing that the Commission 
decisions vary in their relative significance, in the “Numerical Index Outcome” row, we 
use as a robustness check the simple linear index ranging from 1 to 6 that we introduced 
in Section 5.1. This specification, of course, makes the unrealistic assumption that the 
severity of Commission decisions scales linearly.  As an alternative robustness check, the 
“Stricter Challenge Threshold” row changes the threshold of our challenge variable so 
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that mergers withdrawn or cleared at Phase I count as non-challenges.  In unreported 
results, we use a series of different thresholds with qualitatively similar results. 
 
Finally, to ensure that our decision to cluster by industry is not driving our results, we 
also cluster at the nation-pair level (that is, the combination of acquirer nation and target 
nation) in the row titled “Cluster by Nation-Pair.”  Our results hold also under this 
robustness check.  
In unreported results, we also examine the coefficients by time period, and find no 
significant trends or differences with respect to particular years, or the identity of 
Competition Commissioners or EU Commission Presidents whose differential ideologies, 
nationalities or temperaments could lead to differential enforcement priorities. 
 
6.5 Protectionism against US Firms 
As noted above, the Commission has routinely been criticized for being particularly 
interventionist when a firm based in the United States is a party to the transaction.  This 
could be, for instance, because of the inevitable economic and political rivalry between 
two major economic powers that (combined) host the majority of the world’s major 
companies. Some critics also suggest that the EU is particularly envious of the US 
technological dominance and the demonstrated success of the many IP-rich US firms that 
risk leaving less innovative European companies behind.23  
																																																								
23	See, for example, The case against Google: Tie breaker (The Economist, April 23, 2016) noting that 
many technology companies attribute EU Commission’s interventions to the EU having “no successful 





We therefore repeat our above regressions with a constructed dummy variable for 
whether the merger has a US-based acquirer and an EU-based seller.  Table 7 mirrors 
Table 4 and compares mergers with US acquirers and EU sellers with all other mergers in 
the sample.  Again, we find nothing but negative effects of US-based acquirer and EU-
based seller on probability of Commission challenge, which suggest that, if anything, 
mergers with US acquirers and EU sellers are less likely to be challenged. 
[Insert Table 7 Here.]	
It is again instructive to further partition the dataset.  In Table 8, we partition the mergers 
with non-EU acquirers and EU sellers into those with US acquirers and those with non-
US non-EU acquirers, and compare these different categories against the baseline of 
mergers with EU acquirers and EU sellers.  The table shows that, compared to mergers 
with EU acquirers and EU sellers, neither the acquisitions of EU firms by US-based 
acquirers nor the acquisitions of US firms by US-based acquirers face greater likelihood 
of Commission intervention. 
[Insert Table 8 Here.] 
In Table 9, we find no evidence of protectionism when we include an interaction term 
with high-tech industries. The lack of evidence of protectionism remains when we 
perform the analysis using the primary place of business instead of the Commission’s 
designated nationality, or when we designate the nationality of the firms based on the 
acquirer’s ultimate parent’s place of business instead of that of the direct acquirer’s. 
Appendix Table 11 contains additional robustness checks. 




7. Conclusion  
In this Article, we have introduced a unique dataset including all mergers reported to the 
European Commission between 1990—the year when EU merger control was 
established—and August 2014. Our data has allowed us, for the first time, to examine 
systematically several long-hypothesized assumptions of the protectionist foundations of 
EU competition policy. 
 
Our finding challenges the conventional wisdom that portrays the European Commission 
as a protectionist institution that deploys its vast merger control powers as a tool for 
industrial policy. We find no evidence that the Commission has systematically used its 
authority to intervene more frequently or more extensively in transactions involving a 
foreign firm’s acquisition of an EU-based firm, or transactions involving a firm based in 
the United States. If anything, our results suggests that the Commission is less likely to 
challenge transactions involving foreign acquirers. While we cannot claim to have 
conclusively proven that protectionism is absent from Commission merger control, we 
argue that our analysis has, at the minimum, turned the tables and shifted the burden of 
proof to those entertaining these claims.  
 
Our results have significant implications, both theoretical and practical. Beyond their 
direct contribution to the debate on the drivers of European merger policy, our findings 
provide an important corrective to the broader public debate regarding the behavior of 
one of the most powerful regulatory institutions in the world. Our analysis also makes a 
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contribution to the more general academic debates on international spillovers of domestic 
regulatory policies, regulatory constraints on global M&A deals, as well as modern 
manifestations of economic protectionism.  
 
Further, the insights from this study may lead the Commission, the firms, as well as the 
Commission’s critics to adjust their views and behavior. The perception of a foreign-bias 
may have led some companies to refrain from merging or, alternatively, structure their 
deals overly cautiously (and hence inefficiently) in an effort to pre-empt a challenge that 
they expected as forthcoming—perhaps unnecessarily, as our results would suggest. 
Portraying the Commission as a protectionist regulator may also have undermined the 
legitimacy of the Commission or even led the Commission to undertake measures to 
counter this narrative, such as investing extra resources in research on foreign 
transactions to bolster its arguments or giving some foreign firms an easier review in 
some instances to rebut any such harmful public perception. Finally, if the fears of 
protectionist competition policy are unwarranted, the persistent public focus on those 
fears may misguide the critics’ attention from other policy areas where such bias may still 
be prominent and considerably more harmful to consumers and broader society. These 
critics may hence decide to look outside of competition policy instead. After all, we 
certainly do not advance a view that protectionism would not exist in any domain of the 
Commission. The question is rather what form it takes and which particular policies 




Finally, a question arises whether one can extrapolate anything from our analysis of EU 
merger control to other areas of EU competition policy, including investigations in the 
behavior of dominant companies or the Commission state aid decisions. Those areas are 
considerably harder to test empirically as the entire universe of (potential) unilateral 
conduct cases or instances of state aid is not known.24 However, if the Commission were 
a protectionist antitrust enforcer, we would expect those tendencies to feature particularly 
prominently in the merger control area, which involves large companies, high stakes and 
where concerns about the job losses are distinctly salient.  It is, after all, the very same 
institution—the Directorate General for Competition—that engages in investigations 
across mergers, antitrust and state aid cases alike. There would hence need to be some 
reason why the protectionist Commission would rein in its protectionist tendencies in the 
merger area while engaging in biased enforcement elsewhere.   That said, we are hesitant 
to draw too broad conclusions from our empirical findings, which are based on EU 
merger control alone.   
																																																								
24	Unlike in merger control, where all transactions exceeding a certain threshold must be notified to the 
Commission, and the Commission must issue an decision on each of them, we do not know of the antitrust 
cases that the Commission fails to pursue.	
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TABLE 2—SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 Full Sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. 




   
Log Transaction Value (US 
dollars) 
6.553 1.637 
   
European HHI 0.138 0.210 
   
European Relative Market Size 0.028 0.042 
   
Asset Acquisition (probability) 0.355 0.479 
   
Stock Acquisition (probability) 0.299 0.458 
   
Horizontal Transaction  
(probability) 
0.399 0.490 
   
Hostile (probability) 0.022 0.146 
   
   
Acquirer Characteristics   
Financial Sponsor (probability) 0.336 0.472 
   
Acquirer High Tech Industry  
(probability) 
0.207 0.405 
   
Public Acquirer (probability) 0.583 0.493 
   
Target Characteristics   
Public Target (probability) 0.703 0.457 
   
Target Bankrupt (probability) 0.007 0.082 
   
   
Observations 2351  
Notes: Sample consists of transactions for which there is an identified acquirer and seller and for which 





 (1) (2) (3) 
Main Covariates    
Log transaction value 0.308*** 0.220*** 0.243*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) 
    
Financial Sponsor --1.071*** -0.918*** -0.988*** 
 (0.212) (0.224) (0.241) 
    
European HHI  0.865* 0.847* 
  (0.350) (0.347) 
    
European Relative 
Market Size  -11.850*** -11.996*** 
  (3.304) (3.428) 
    
Public Acquirer  0.229 0.299 
  (0.174) (0.197) 
    
Hostile  0.826* 0.852* 
  (0.344) (0.356) 
    
Asset Acquisition  -0.153 -0.165 
  (0.173) (0.177) 
    
Stock Acquisition  -0.372* -0.606** 
  (0.189) (0.234) 
    
Horizontal Transaction  0.358* 0.368* 
  (0.146) (0.158) 
    
Additional Covariates No No Yes 
Industry FE No No No 
N 2351 2338 2338 
Psuedo R2 .0896 .1206 .1244 
Note: Logit results for regression of commission challenges.  All specifications include fixed effects 
for year and number of acquirers.  Column 3 contains covariates for whether the acquirer is in a high 
tech industry; whether the acquirer is a governmental entity; whether the acquisition is of a subsidiary 
of a larger company as opposed to an acquisition of the entire company; whether the target’s ultimate 
parent is a publicly traded company; whether the acquirer fully or partially owns the target after the 
transaction; whether the target was in bankruptcy at the time of the transaction; and whether the 
acquirer is a special purpose vehicle. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 2-digit industry 
level. 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
National Indicators      
Non-EU Acquirer & EU 
Seller 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.018 -0.009 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) 
      
Main Covariates      
Log transaction value 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
      
Financial Sponsor -0.096*** -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.071*** -0.065** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) 
      
European HHI  0.096* 0.097*   
  (0.044) (0.044)   
      
European Relative 
Market Size 
 -0.691*** -0.697***   
  (0.197) (0.202)   
      
Public Acquirer  0.025 0.028 0.022 0.024 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
      
Hostile  0.182** 0.184** 0.173* 0.180* 
  (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) (0.076) 
      
Asset Acquisition  -0.023 -0.024 -0.029 -0.027 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) 
      
Stock Acquisition  -0.042* -0.058** -0.030 -0.011 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
      
Horizontal Transaction  0.040* 0.042* 0.019 0.024 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
      
Additional Covariates No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No No No 2-digit 4-digit 
N 2351 2338 2338 2338 2338 
R2 .0651 .0892 .0913 .1577 .3177 
Note: All specifications include fixed effects for year and number of acquirers.  Column 3 
contains covariates for whether the acquirer is in a high tech industry; whether the acquirer is a 
governmental entity; whether the acquisition is of a subsidiary of a larger company as opposed to 
an acquisition of the entire company; whether the target’s ultimate parent is a publicly traded 
company; whether the acquirer fully or partially owns the target after the transaction; whether the 
target was in bankruptcy at the time of the transaction; and whether the acquirer is a special 
purpose vehicle. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 2-digit industry level. 





 TABLE 5—COMMISSION CHALLENGES (BASELINE: ALL-EU TRANSACTIONS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
National Indicators      
Non-EU Acquirer & EU 
Seller 
-0.017 -0.021 -0.020 -0.031 -0.023 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) 
      
Non-EU Acquirer & 
Non-EU Seller 
-0.018 -0.029 -0.024 -0.041* -0.039 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) 
      
EU Acquirer & Non-EU 
Seller 
-0.006 -0.016 -0.012 -0.029 -0.035 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) 
Main Covariates      
Log transaction value 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
      
Financial Sponsor -0.096*** -0.072*** -0.078*** -0.072*** -0.066** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) 
      
European HHI  0.101* 0.100*   
  (0.046) (0.045)   
      
European Relative 
Market Size 
 -0.699*** -0.702***   
  (0.201) (0.205)   
      
Public Acquirer  0.027 0.029 0.023 0.025 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
      
Hostile  0.178** 0.181** 0.166* 0.174* 
  (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.076) 
      
Asset Acquisition  -0.025 -0.025 -0.031* -0.029 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) 
      
Stock Acquisition  -0.045* -0.060** -0.033 -0.014 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
      
Horizontal Transaction  0.039* 0.042* 0.018 0.023 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
      
Additional Covariates No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No No No 2-digit 4-digit 
N 2351 2338 2338 2338 2338 
R2 .0654 .0901 .0919 .1595 .3191 
Note: All specifications include fixed effects for year and number of acquirers.  Column 3 
contains covariates for whether the acquirer is in a high tech industry; whether the acquirer is a 
governmental entity; whether the acquisition is of a subsidiary of a larger company as opposed to 
an acquisition of the entire company; whether the target’s ultimate parent is a publicly traded 
company; whether the acquirer fully or partially owns the target after the transaction; whether the 
target was in bankruptcy at the time of the transaction; and whether the acquirer is a special 
purpose vehicle. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 2-digit industry level. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
	
	









 (1) (2) (3) 
Non-EU Acquirer & EU Seller -0.015 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
    
Acquirer High Tech 0.031   
 (0.032)   
    
Acquirer High Tech * Non-EU 
Acquirer & EU Seller 
0.015   
 (0.048)   
    
N 2351 2338 2338 
R2 .0651 .0892 .0913 
Note: All specifications include fixed effects for year and number of acquirers, as well as the 
following covariates: log transaction value; European industry HHI; European industry relative 
market size; public acquirer; hostile transaction; acquisition of assets; acquisition of stock; 
financial-sponsor-related; and horizontal transaction. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 
2-digit industry level. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
	
	
TABLE 7—COMMISSION CHALLENGES BY US NATIONALITY CATEGORY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
National Indicators      
US Acquirer & EU 
Seller 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) 
      
Main Covariates      
Log transaction value 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
      
Financial Sponsor -0.097*** -0.074*** -0.080*** -0.073*** -0.066** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) 
      
European HHI  0.096* 0.097*   
  (0.044) (0.044)   
      
European Relative 
Market Size 
 -0.692*** -0.698***   
  (0.196) (0.202)   
      
Public Acquirer  0.024 0.027 0.021 0.024 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
      
Hostile  0.182** 0.184** 0.172* 0.179* 
  (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) (0.076) 
      
Asset Acquisition  -0.024 -0.025 -0.029 -0.027 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) 
      
Stock Acquisition  -0.042* -0.058** -0.030 -0.012 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
      
Horizontal Transaction  0.041* 0.043* 0.020 0.024 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
      
Additional Covariates No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No No No 2-digit 4-digit 
N 2351 2338 2338 2338 2338 
R2 .0648 .0889 .0911 .1572 .3176 
Note: All specifications include fixed effects for year and number of acquirers.  Column 3 contains 
covariates for whether the acquirer is in a high tech industry; whether the acquirer is a governmental 
entity; whether the acquisition is of a subsidiary of a larger company as opposed to an acquisition of 
the entire company; whether the target’s ultimate parent is a publicly traded company; whether the 
acquirer fully or partially owns the target after the transaction; whether the target was in bankruptcy at 
the time of the transaction; and whether the acquirer is a special purpose vehicle. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) clustered at 2-digit industry level. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
	
	
TABLE 8—COMMISSION CHALLENGES BY US NATIONALITY (BASELINE: ALL-EU TRANSACTIONS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
National Indicators      
US Acquirer & EU Seller -0.011 -0.015 -0.013 -0.020 -0.018 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) 
      
US Acquirer & US Seller -0.028 -0.041 -0.035 -0.046 -0.040 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) 
      
EU Acquirer & US Seller -0.060 -0.072 -0.066 -0.082 -0.086 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.063) 
      
Other Non-US Non-EU -0.009 -0.015 -0.013 -0.032 -0.026 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) 
      
Main Covariates      
Log transaction value 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
      
Financial Sponsor -0.097*** -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.067** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) 
      
European HHI  0.102* 0.102*   
  (0.045) (0.045)   
      
European Relative   -0.702*** -0.705***   
Market Size  (0.201) (0.204)   
      
Public Acquirer  0.027 0.028 0.022 0.024 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
      
Hostile  0.176** 0.178** 0.165* 0.175* 
  (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.075) 
      
Asset Acquisition  -0.026 -0.026 -0.031* -0.029 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) 
      
Stock Acquisition  -0.048* -0.062** -0.035 -0.016 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
      
Horizontal Transaction  0.040* 0.042* 0.019 0.024 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
Additional Covariates No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No No No 2-digit 4-digit 
N 2351 2338 2338 2338 2338 
R2 .0662 .0912 .0928 .1603 .3198 
Note: All specifications include fixed effects for year and number of acquirers.  Column 3 contains 
covariates for whether the acquirer is in a high tech industry; whether the acquirer is a governmental 
entity; whether the acquisition is of a subsidiary of a larger company as opposed to an acquisition of the 
entire company; whether the target’s ultimate parent is a publicly traded company; whether the acquirer 
fully or partially owns the target after the transaction; whether the target was in bankruptcy at the time 
of the transaction; and whether the acquirer is a special purpose vehicle. “Other Non-US Non-EU” 
consists of transactions with non-US and non-EU acquirer or seller. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
clustered at 2-digit industry level. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
	
	









 (1) (2) (3) 
US Acquirer & EU Seller -0.013 0.004 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) 
    
Acquirer High Tech -0.035   
 (0.029)   
    
Acquirer High Tech * US 
Acquirer & EU Seller 
0.054   
 (0.050)   
    
N 2338 2338 2338 
R2 .0904 .0889 .089 
Note: All specifications include fixed effects for year and number of acquirers, as well as the 
following covariates: log transaction value; European industry HHI; European industry relative 
market size; public acquirer; hostile transaction; acquisition of assets; acquisition of stock; 
financial-sponsor-related; and horizontal transaction. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 
2-digit industry level. 
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Appendix 
TABLE 10—COMMISSION CHALLENGES—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 Coefficient on Non-EU Acquirer, EU Seller N R2 
    
(1) Reversed Partition -0.008 2338 0.089 
 (0.017)   
    
(2) Fraction of Parties -0.012 2338 0.089 
 (0.012)   
    
(3) Inclusion of Joint Ventures -0.013 2639 0.086 
 (0.013)   
    
(4) Logit Specification -0.122 2338  
 (0.157)   
    
(5) Full Set of Transactions -0.036*** 5259 0.022 
 (0.009)   
    
(6) Numerical Index Outcome -0.009 2338 0.064 
 (0.028)   
    
(7) Stricter Challenge Thresholds    
(a) Cleared at Phase II -0.001 2338 0.0374 
 (-0.15)   
    
(b) Conditions at Phase II or -0.001 2338 0.0391 
withdrawal at Phase II (0.009)   
    
(c) Absolute prohibition -0.000 2338 0.0179 
 (-0.16)   
    
(8) Cluster by Nation-Pair -0.005 2338 0.089 
    
 (0.017)   
    
Note: Row (1) reverses the variable definitions in the partitioning of the dataset, counting a merger as non-
EU acquirer and EU seller if all acquirers are non-EU and all sellers are EU-based.  Row (2) replaces the 
categorical nationality variables with fractions—that is, the share of acquirers that are non-EU times the 
share of sellers that are EU-based rather than a simple binary dummy; Row (3) includes joint venture 
parties, counting them as sellers; Row (4) estimates a logit specification; Row (5) uses the entire set of 
	
	
5,259 mergers, rather than limiting to those for which we have covariates; Row (6) replaces the binary 
dependent variable with our numerical index outcome variable, which takes the values 1-6 depending on 
the degree of the challenge; Row 7 increases the minimum threshold for a challenge: (7a) counts mergers 
cleared or withdrawn at Phase I as non-challenges; (7b) counts mergers cleared at phase II as non-
challenges; (7c) counts mergers with conditions or withdrawal at Phase II as non-challenges. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) clustered at 2-digit industry level; and Row (8) clusters at the Acquiror Ultimate 
Parent Nation-Target Nation level (using SDC’s primary place of business as the variable of interest so that 
each transaction has one acquirer and one target).  All specifications include fixed effects for year and 
number of acquirers, and all but Row (4) include the following covariates: log transaction value; European 
industry HHI; European industry relative market size; public acquirer; hostile transaction; acquisition of 
assets; acquisition of stock; financial-sponsor-related; and horizontal transaction. Row (4) includes an 
indicator variable for joint ventures.  Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 2-digit industry level 
except for Row (8). 





TABLE 11—COMMISSION CHALLENGES—US ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 Coefficient on US Acquirer, EU Seller N R2 
    
(1) Reversed Partition 0.006 2338 0.089 
 (0.021)   
    
(2) Fraction of Parties -0.002 2338 0.089 
 (0.020)   
    
(3) Inclusion of Joint Ventures -0.004 2639 0.086 
 (0.017)   
    
(4) Logit Specification -0.011 2338  
 (0.191)   
    
(5) Full Set of Transactions -0.027* 5259 0.021 
 (0.011)   
    
(6) Numerical Index Outcome -0.012 2338 0.064 
 (0.030)   
    
(7) Stricter Challenge Thresholds    
(a) Cleared at Phase II -0.001 2338 0.0374 
 (0.008)   
    
(b) Conditions at Phase II or -0.006 2338 0.0391 
withdrawal at Phase II (-0.006)   
    
(c) Absolute prohibition -0.000 2338 0.0179 
 (-0.003)   
    
(8) Cluster by Nation-Pair 0.005 2338 0.089 
 (0.022)   
    
Note: Row (1) reverses the variable definitions in the partitioning of the dataset, counting a merger as US 
acquirer and EU seller if all acquirers are US-based and all sellers are EU-based.  Row (2) replaces the 
categorical nationality variables with fractions—that is, the share of acquirers that are US times the share of 
sellers that are EU-based rather than a simple binary dummy; Row (3) includes joint venture parties, 
counting them as sellers; Row (4) estimates a logit specification; Row (5) uses the entire set of 5,259 
mergers, rather than limiting to those for which we have covariates; Row (6) replaces the binary dependent 
variable with our numerical index outcome variable, which takes the values 1-6 depending on the degree of 
the challenge; Row 7 increases the minimum threshold for a challenge: (7a) counts mergers cleared or 
withdrawn at Phase I as non-challenges; (7b) counts mergers cleared at phase II as non-challenges; (7c) 
counts mergers with conditions or withdrawal at Phase II as non-challenges; and Row (8) clusters at the 
Acquiror Ultimate Parent Nation-Target Nation level (using SDC’s primary place of business as the 
variable of interest so that each transaction has one acquirer and one target).  All specifications include 
fixed effects for year and number of acquirers, and all but Row (4) include the following covariates: log 
transaction value; European industry HHI; European industry relative market size; public acquirer; hostile 
transaction; acquisition of assets; acquisition of stock; financial-sponsor-related; and horizontal transaction. 
Row (4) includes an indicator variable for joint ventures.  Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 2-
digit industry level except for Row (8). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
